Authentication
Pass user auth context from your frontend to the agent so it can scope tools, data, and decisions to the signed-in user.
This feature (auth) hasn't been tagged in any Deep Agents cell yet. Try CopilotKit's Built-in Agent, LangGraph (Python), LangGraph (TypeScript).
You have a chat surface or a hook driving an agent and you want every agent run to know who the request came from. By the end of this guide, your frontend will forward a token, the runtime will pass it through, and your agent code will read the resulting user info on every turn.
When to use this#
- Multi-tenant apps where the agent reads or writes per-user data.
- Tool gating where some tools should only run for authorised users.
- Audit and billing where every run needs an identity to attribute it to.
- Session-aware UX where the agent's behaviour depends on the user's role or permissions.
If you don't need any of those, skip auth entirely. The agent runs anonymously and the frontend never has to care about tokens.
Tool gating#
The most common reason to wire auth is so individual tools can decline to run. Read the resolved user inside the tool's handler and bail if the role doesn't match:
def delete_record(record_id: str, *, user: User):
if "admin" not in user.permissions:
raise PermissionError("admin role required")
# do the deleteThis composes with Human in the loop: gate on auth first, surface a confirmation card next, execute last.
Thread authorization#
Verifying who the caller is doesn't yet stop them reaching someone else's conversation. How much of that you have to build depends on which runtime you're running.
| Runtime | Who scopes threads to a user |
|---|---|
CopilotRuntime with intelligence | Mostly the runtime, via identifyUser — with three routes you still have to guard. |
| Anything else — SSE runtime, custom store, local in-memory runner | You do. See Scope threads yourself. |
The Intelligence Platform scopes most thread routes#
The Intelligence runtime requires an identifyUser callback — construction throws without one (or without at least one Channel). It runs on the server, once per request, and the id it returns is the scope the runtime hands to the platform. (intelligence below is a CopilotKitIntelligence instance; Connect your runtime to Intelligence covers building it.)
const runtime = new CopilotRuntime({
agents: { default: agent },
intelligence,
identifyUser: async (request) => {
const session = await verifyAppSession(request); // Your server-side auth.
if (!session?.user) throw new Error("Unauthorized"); // Backstop; see below.
return { id: session.user.id, name: session.user.name };
},
});`identifyUser` is not an authentication gate
Most routes resolve the caller through identifyUser, but not all of them do — and the
ones that don't never invoke your callback at all. Rejecting unauthenticated requests is
onRequest's job: it runs before routing, on every route, without exception. Treat
identifyUser as the thing that names an already-authenticated caller, never as the thing
that decides whether a caller gets in.
Where a route does resolve the caller, what matters next is whether that id is actually carried to the platform as a scope:
| Route | Scoped to the resolved user? |
|---|---|
agent/run, agent/connect | Yes |
threads/list | Yes — and filtered by agentId, so useThreads returns the caller's threads rather than the project's |
threads/messages | Yes |
threads/update (rename via PATCH, delete via DELETE), threads/archive | Yes |
| Thread subscription token | Yes |
threads/events, threads/state | No — resolves the caller, then ignores it |
agent/stop | No — never resolves a caller at all |
Three routes are not user-scoped
threads/events and threads/state back the inspector. Both resolve the
caller and then discard the result, reading the thread by id alone — the runtime calls the
platform's project-authenticated _inspect endpoints, which take no user parameter. Any
caller can read the full event log and current agent state of any thread in the project,
given its threadId.
agent/stop never resolves a caller. It goes straight to runner.stop({ threadId }),
which aborts whichever run the runtime is tracking under that thread id. Any caller who
learns an active threadId can kill that run mid-flight.
Guard all three yourself. The onBeforeHandler pattern below applies on the Intelligence
path too, narrowed to these routes:
onBeforeHandler: async ({ request, route }) => {
// Switch rather than an array `includes`, so `route` narrows and
// `route.threadId` type-checks — all three variants carry one.
switch (route.method) {
case "threads/events":
case "threads/state":
case "agent/stop":
break;
default:
return;
}
// None of these is scoped platform-side; check your own ownership record.
const user = await verifyRequest(request);
if (!(await userOwnsThread(user.id, route.threadId))) {
throw new Response("Not found", { status: 404 });
}
},Without an ownership record of your own, reject these routes outright rather than leaving them open.
For everything in the Yes rows there is no ownership table to build. What you own is identifyUser itself:
- Derive the id from a server-verified credential. The callback receives the raw
Request; whatever it returns is trusted from there on. Reading a user id straight out of a header or request body hands every caller the ability to name themselves. - Return a stable id. It is the key threads hang off. Change it — swapping an email for a subject claim, say — and that user's existing threads stop resolving.
- Send the
401fromonRequest. Beyond the status codes being wrong — anidentifyUserthat throws surfaces as a500, a malformed id as a400— routes likeagent/stopnever call it, so a check placed only here isn't reached on every request. Authenticate inonRequest, which runs on every route and can throw aResponsedirectly, and keep the throw insideidentifyUseras a backstop.
A static identifyUser value is suitable only for a single-user demo. In a multi-user
application every request must resolve the authenticated user, or those users share one
thread scope.
See Scope Rich Threads to the signed-in user for the full runtime contract.
Scope threads yourself#
Without the Intelligence Platform there is no server-side binding between a threadId and a user. A threadId is just an opaque id travelling in a request: if user A learns user B's, every thread route accepts it. The rest of this section is the pattern for a custom store, a plain SSE runtime, or the local in-memory runner — and it's also what you narrow to threads/events, threads/state, and agent/stop if you are on the platform.
Own the mapping
Whatever stores your threads, keep a record of who each one belongs to. The minimum is a table your runtime can query:
create table thread_owners (
thread_id text primary key,
user_id text not null
);
create index on thread_owners (user_id);Write a row when a conversation is first created — see minting a thread with your own API for where that hooks into the chat lifecycle.
Enforce it in onBeforeHandler
onRequest runs before routing, so it can't see which thread is being addressed. onBeforeHandler runs after, and receives a route that names the operation and — for thread-scoped routes — the threadId:
const handler = createCopilotRuntimeHandler({
runtime,
basePath: "/api/copilotkit",
hooks: {
onRequest: async ({ request }) => {
// Authenticate first: reject anonymous callers outright.
const user = await verifyRequest(request);
if (!user) throw new Response("Unauthorized", { status: 401 });
},
onBeforeHandler: async ({ request, route }) => {
const user = await verifyRequest(request);
// Routes that name a thread directly.
if ("threadId" in route) {
if (!(await userOwnsThread(user.id, route.threadId))) {
throw new Response("Forbidden", { status: 403 });
}
return;
}
// agent/run and agent/connect carry the thread in the body instead.
if (route.method === "agent/run" || route.method === "agent/connect") {
// Clone: the handler still needs to read the original body.
const { threadId } = await request.clone().json();
if (threadId && !(await userOwnsThread(user.id, threadId))) {
throw new Response("Forbidden", { status: 403 });
}
}
},
},
});The routes that carry a threadId on route are agent/stop, threads/update, threads/archive, threads/messages, threads/events, and threads/state.
A thread id is not a secret
Treat threadId as a public identifier, like a database primary key in a URL. It travels
through the browser, appears in logs, and is trivially enumerable if you mint sequential
ids. Authorization has to be an explicit ownership check — never "they knew the id, so they
must own it". Minting UUIDs makes guessing impractical but is not itself a control.
Filter the thread list
threads/list has no threadId to check, so onBeforeHandler has nothing to authorize against. Off the platform the route returns whatever the configured store holds — the local in-memory runner filters by agentId only, and a custom store returns exactly what you wrote. Build the list from your own ownership table instead, and drive the chat with the selected id.
Filter server-side. Hiding rows in the UI leaves the underlying route open.
With no platform thread store, the ownership table above is your thread list. See Self-managed thread persistence.
Security checklist#
- Always validate the token on the backend. Never trust the frontend's claim.
- Scope every read and write to the resolved user. Auth context only matters if you actually use it to filter data.
- Authenticate in
onRequest. It is the only hook that runs on every route.identifyUsernames a caller; it does not gate one, and some routes never invoke it. - Bind threads to a user. On the Intelligence Platform that means a correct
identifyUser, plus your own guard onthreads/events,threads/state, andagent/stop; off it, an ownership check on every thread route rather than only at login. See Thread authorization. - Don't log raw tokens. Log the resolved user id (or
anonymous) instead. - Use HTTPS in production. The Bearer token is sensitive.
- Refresh strategy. Your frontend is responsible for rotating expired tokens before they reach the agent. CopilotKit doesn't refresh on your behalf.